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ALTERNATIVE RELIEF AVAILABLE
TO DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS
OF A CASH-OUT MERGER
by
EDWIN DAVILA*
This article relates to the standing and right of a minority shareholder,
who has dissented from a cash-out merger and commenced an appraisal
proceeding, to pursue a separate individual claim of fraud in the merger
through an action for rescissory damages against the participants for
breaches of fiduciary duties to the shareholder. This issue arises from
a cash-out merger of the minority shareholder. The situation encompasses
two suits: a first filed statutory appraisal proceeding (the "Appraisal Ac-
tion"); and a later filed shareholder's individual suit for damages for
alleged fraud, conspiracy, self-dealing and waste of corporate assets (the
"Fraud Action").
The Appraisal Action arises under the authority of Ohio Revised Code
Section 1701.85. The requirements of that statute are: (1) the shareholder
is one of record; (2) the shares were not voted in favor of the merger at
a meeting held concerning the merger; (3) a written demand be served
by the shareholder on the company within a specified period of time; and
(4) the shareholder deliver to the company his certificates for the endorse-
ment of a legend thereon within fifteen (15) days from the request. After
complying with these requirements, the shareholder then has a right to
obtain a judicial determination of the fair cash value of his shares. In
the Appraisal Action, the sole defendant is the surviving corporation of
the merger.
For some period of time, it was thought that the Appraisal Action was
the sole and exclusive remedy of a dissenting shareholder. However, both
the Ohio Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Delaware now agree
that fiduciary duty claims can be brought in a separate action. Armstrong
v. Marathon Oil Ca, 32 Ohio St. 3d 397 (1987), and Cede & Ca v.
Technicolor, Inc, 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. Supr., 1988).
In Armstrong, the plaintiffs were minority shareholders of Marathon
Oil Co. ("Marathon"), who challenged the fairness of the merger price.
The case arose out of the cash-out merger between Marathon and U.S.
Steel. The Ohio Supreme Court dealt with a number of issues regarding
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the appraisal remedy, including a challenge to the unfairness of the
merger.
The Ohio Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether the appraisal
remedy was the exclusive remedy available in the final portion of the
opinion. Specifically, one plaintiff sought to join her appraisal claim with
other claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court held that the fiduciary
duty claims could not be brought in the appraisal proceeding. However,
the Court held that a shareholder could seek to recover "provable injury"
for such claims in a separate proceeding. Id. at 422. The Ohio Supreme
Court clearly recognized that separate actions for breaches of fiduciary
duties may exist, but these may be limited to challenges of the procedural
fairness of the transaction or to recovery of the fair cash value in accord-
ance with the standard enunciated in Armstrong.
In arriving at its holding, that the fiduciary duty claims could be
brought in separate proceedings, the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Delaware. Specifically, the Ohio
Supreme Court reasoned:
[the fiduciary duty claims] arise out of the actions of the
Marathon board of directors in structuring and consummating
the tender offer-merger transaction before us. The essence of
these claims, primarily equitable in nature is that the board of
directors and controlling shareholders of their company breached
their fiduciary duties in connection with the initiation, timing,
negotiation, structure, approval, etc., of that merger. Conse-
quently, plaintiffs and amici would require an inquiry into the
entire fairness of the transaction and, presumably, allow
whatever inquiry is necessary on the issue of the value of the
corporation in light of the price offered to the dissenting
shareholders for their stock, citing Weinberger u UOP, Inc (Del.
1983), 457 A. 2d 701, and Rabkin u Philip A. Hunt Chemical
Corp (Del. 1985), 498 A. 2d 1099. See also, Singer v. Maganvox
Ca (Del. 1985), 380 A. 2d 969; Tanzer v. International General
Industries, Inc (Del. 1977), 379 A. 2d 1121. [Emphasis supplied.]
Id at 421.
To support its conclusion that the appraisal proceedings are not the
exclusive remedy available to dissenting shareholders, the Ohio Supreme
Court also stated:
Although not dwelt upon in the briefs, Rabkin, supra, and
Singer, supra, allow the maintenance of an alternative cause of
action in addition to the Delaware statutory proceeding for the
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appraisal of dissenting shareholders' stock. Del. Code. Ann. Title
8, Section 262 (1975). The Delaware statute, of course, relied
specifically upon the stock market price as representing the
value of the stock. Id at Section 262(k), deleted by amendment
(1983). By allowing the additional cause of action outside the
statutory guidelines, the courts of Delaware permitted analysis
of the amount offered to minority shareholders under theories
of breach of fiduciary duties, lack of proper business purpose
in cashing out the minority shareholder, gross inadequacy of
price, misrepresentations in the proxy statement, failure to con-
sider the "full value" of the shares, and that by breach of these
fiduciary duties, the corporation failed to pay the full, fair value
of the shares held. Obviously, such causes of action, centering
as they do around the issue of whether the transactions provided
"entire fairness" to the dissenter, permit a full inquiry into the
intrinsic value of the dissenters' stock utilizing any techniques
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community and otherwise admissible in court. [Em-
phasis supplied.]
Armstrong supra at 421.
Similarly in Cede & Ca, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware
held that a dissenting shareholder may pursue under Delaware law both
an appraisal remedy and a separate individual action for rescissory
damages.
In Cede & Ca, Cinerama instituted an appraisal proceeding pursuant
to 8 Del. C. § 262 after voting against the proposed merger. Two years
later, Cinerama discovered wrongdoing by Technicolor management
associated with the merger. Cinerama then filed a separate fraud action,
charging Technicolor and others with conspiracy, fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty and other wrongdoing in the merger.
Technicolor and the others moved to dismiss the fraud action, assert-
ing that Cinerama lacked standing to institute a fraud action after elect-
ing appraisal relief under Section 262. The Delaware trial court held that
Cinerama was required to elect whether to pursue the appraisal pro-
ceeding or the proceeding in which it asserted claims for breaches of
fiduciary duty. For the first time, the Supreme Court of the State of
Delaware addressed the standing and right of a shareholder dissenting
from a cash out merger to pursue both an appraisal remedy and a separate
individual action for rescissory damages based on a claim of fraud in the
merger.
Fall, 1989]
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Citing the identical cases that were cited by the Ohio Supreme Court,
i.e. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Supr. 1983), and Rabkin
v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp, 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. Supr. 1985), the
Delaware Supreme Court distinguished the remedies of appraisal and
rescissory suit. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that an appraisal
proceeding is a determination of the value of the appraisal-petitioners'
shares on the date of the merger; however, in contrast, a fraud action
asserting unfair dealing and unfair price claims affords an expansive
remedy and is brought against the alleged wrongdoers to provide whatever
relief the facts of a particular case may require.
In holding that a separate cause of action could be brought based upon
claims of breaches of fiduciary duties, the Delaware Court specifically
stated:
based upon the appraisal/fraud distinctions found in Weinberger
and Rabkin, policy concerns, and considerations of equity, as
a matter of law we affirm the Court of Chancery's ruling deny-
ing defendant's motion to dismiss Cinerama's fraud action.
Under the record before us, the Chancery properly allowed
Cinerama to pursue both a statutory appraisal remedy and its
fraud action; therefore, the defendant's cross-appeal, asserting
that Cinerama lacks standing to pursue its fraud action, fails.
Cede & Ca, supra at 19-20
CONCLUSION
Courts are beginning to recognize that statutory appraisal proceedings
cannot be the sole and exclusive means for determining the loss incurred
by a dissenting shareholder of a cash-out merger. Both Ohio and Delaware
recognize that causes of action, which seek compensation other than the
value of a dissenter's shares of stock, can be maintained. However, such
separate and distinct theories for recovery of losses occasioned by unfair
circumstances of the merger have to be maintained in separate pro-
ceedings, subject to separate applicable statutes of limitations, and the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
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